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Abstract: Despite all advantages, online self-disclosure can 
cause harms to the development of the users’ personality. 
Hence, governments around the world, including the 
German and the U.S. governments, may feel a need to 
compel or nudge users into revealing less and thereby 
protect users from their own mistakes. However, the paper 
will argue both that governments are neither obliged nor 
allowed to prevent competent adult users from voluntary 
online self-disclosure by paternalistic interventions that only 
aim to protect the users. These findings extend to the 
approach of using nudges to correct irrational behavior, 
discussed with particular intensity in current U.S. 
scholarship. Instead, the paper suggests alternative paths to 
protect users from disadvantageous, but voluntary self-
disclosure while respecting the users’ autonomy and 
constitutional rights. 
A. INTRODUCTION 
“Privacy is not an optional good, like a second home or an investment 
account” (Anita L. Allen)2 
1 The title pays tribute to Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 
(1999). For a broader discussion of the legal requirements to coerce online privacy, see  
BARBARA SANDFUCHS, PRIVATHEIT WIDER WILLEN? (2015). 
2 See Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723, 740 (1999). 
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 In today’s society, competent adult internet users voluntarily 
disclose vast amounts of data about themselves. This may lead to 
numerous advantages, such as economic benefits or increased 
convenience. Nevertheless such voluntary behavior can cause great 
harm to the users (see B). 
 Governments3 may feel that by relatively small interventions they 
could protect their citizens from acts of self-disclosure which are not 
in the users’ best interest. They could take the role of a nanny, balance 
the pros and cons of certain forms of self-disclosure, and prevent self-
disclosures that result in more disadvantages than advantages for the 
users. But, must they do so? May they do so? And if not, are they left 
with tied hands? 
 Courts both in Germany and in the United States regularly reject 
limitations on the freedoms of competent adult individuals, unless 
their behavior causes harms to others or the society. The question will 
thus be: are the harms inflicted by careless self-disclosure great 
enough to warrant government intervention? 
 When investigating these questions, it seems promising to follow a 
comparative approach by examining Germany as one of the most 
influential and traditionally privacy-friendly jurisdictions within the 
European Union, and at the United States as the base of the leading 
online businesses, such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft. 
 This paper focuses on online privacy, understood as informational 
privacy in the online environment.4 For the purpose of the following 
research, informational privacy shall mean the individual’s right to 
informational self-determination, that is, the right to decide 
personally about the disclosure and application of their personal data. 
 Online privacy can be compromised by two kinds of voluntary 
online self-disclosure. One way is by means of explicit disclosure, such 
3 For the purpose of this paper, the term “government” is meant not to be limited to the 
executive branch, but to include all public actors both on the federal and (with exceptions) 
on the state level. 
4 Disclaimer: This paper does not attempt to present a universal definition of privacy, but 
only aims at determining a workable approach.  See Richard A. Posner, The Right of 
Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 393 (1978) (“The concept of ʽprivacyʼ  is elusive and ill 
defined. Much ink has been spilled in trying to clarify its meaning.” Though countless 
scholars have contributed to the debate about privacy, this statement from 1978 is still 
valid today. The various characterizations that have been suggested, such as privacy as 
secrecy, as control over personal data, as limited access to persons or simply as intimacy all 
leave out important aspects or are too broad, in most cases both); see also DANIEL J. 
SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY (2009) (gives an extensive critique of these conceptions 
and an account of privacy as a nexus of many concepts that share a Wittgensteinian family 
resemblance). 
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as adding personal information to profiles in social networks, to blogs, 
or to personal websites. Explicit disclosure occurs intentionally and 
purposefully. The other way, which is of greater impact, is through 
implicit disclosure. The use of almost any kind of online service is 
accompanied by the collection, storage and aggregation of vast 
amounts of data, for example about the users’ browsing and online 
shopping activities. Among other things, these data are used to 
provide users with future online experiences according to their 
preferences. Storing IP-addresses, placing cookies, using web-bugs, 
java script tags, as well as browser and OS fingerprints allows the 
website operators and third parties to track the users’ online behavior. 
These data can then be used to generate information about the users.5  
 Comparing their data with existing databases allows the discovery 
of correlations and behavior patterns that the users themselves are 
often unaware of. These can be used to predict future activities and 
preferences.6 Even though implicit self-disclosure is not usually 
intended by users, it is based on their active use of a website or service 
which processes data or allows third parties to do so. 
 When disclosing data both in explicit and implicit ways, users are 
often not aware of all relevant information regarding the 
consequences of the self-disclosure. For example, users regularly do 
not read all relevant privacy policies as well as other types of standard 
terms of contract.7 However, if they have the option to familiarize 
5 While the term “data” refers to the original data itself, “information” is understood as the 
product of the analysis of data. 
6 See also Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will 
Transform How We Live, Work and Think (2013) (giving examples of the possibilities 
offered by big data). 
7 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and 
Economics Approach to Standard Form Contracts 1, 3, 26 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ. Working 
Papers, Paper No. 195, 2009) (this study investigated the browsing habits of 
45,091 households regarding 66 online software companies and showed that only in 
0.05 percent of the 120,545 visits to the sites the license agreements were clicked on for at 
least one second and that an average stay on the license agreement site of 47.7 seconds was 
not sufficient to even read the average 2,277 words. During 5,509 visits that entered a 
secure session (which indicates the formation of a contract), only in 0.11 percent of the 
cases the terms of contract were accessed); see also John Brownlee, GameStation EULA 
collects 7,500 souls from unsuspecting customers, Geek (Apr. 16, 2010), 
http://www.geek.com/games/gamestation-eula-collects-7500-souls-from-unsuspecting-
customers-1194091/ (this software company on April 1, 2010 added the following clause to 
their standard terms of contract: “By placing an order via this Web site on the first day of 
the fourth month of the year 2010 Anno Domini, you agree to grant Us a non transferable 
option to claim, for now and for ever more, your immortal soul. Should We wish to exercise 
this option, you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, 
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themselves with all important information regarding the disclosure 
and, e.g. out of lack of time or laziness, do not use this chance, from a 
legal perspective such disclosure is to be considered voluntary. 
 By contrast, self-disclosure is involuntary if users: a) are physically 
forced to disclose (a rather rare scenario that the paper will not pay 
further attention to); b) lack the necessary capacity to understand the 
decision (as, for example, minors or mentally ill people might);8 or c) 
encounter themselves in situations where the freedom of decision is 
severely restricted. The latter may be the case if persons lack any 
bargaining power, but have a great need to receive a good or service.9 
 In all other situations, both explicit and implicit self-disclosure are 
to be considered voluntary.10 In specific cases, especially the implicit 
within 5 (five) working days of receiving written notification from gamesation.co.uk or one 
of its duly authorized minions. We reserve the right to serve such notice in 6 (six) foot high 
letters of fire, however we can accept no liability for any loss or damage caused by such an 
act. If you a) do not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to another 
party, or c) do not wish to grant Us such a license, please click the link below to nullify this 
subclause and proceed with your transaction.” Though the opt-out-option was optically 
highlighted and though an opt-out was awarded with a five-Pound-voucher, 88 percent of 
the users (ca. 7,500 users) accepted the clause). 
8 See generally Bundesverfassungsgericht Entscheidungen [BVerfGE] [Federal 
Constitutional Court Cases] Feb. 10, 1960, 10, 302 (322) (Ger.); BVerfGE July 18, 1967, 22, 
180 (219) (Ger.); BVerfGE July 10, 1981, 58, 208 (224) (Ger.); Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
[BVerwG] [Federal Administrative Court], Feb. 14, 1989, NJW 1989 (2960-2961) (Ger.); 
Bayerischer Verfassungsgerichtshof [BayVerfGH] [Bavarian Constitutional Court], NJW 
1989, 1790 (1790-1791) (Ger.). 
9 See BVerfG, Oct. 23, 2006, MMR 2007, 93 (93) (Ger.); BVerfG, RDG 2013, (230 et seq.) 
(Ger.); Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] [Federal Court of 
Justice Civil Cases] July 16, 2008, 177, 253 (Ger.) (these cases are further examples for 
restricting decisional freedom or rendering the validity of consent). 
10 See, e.g., German Genetic Diagnosis Act [GGDA], § 18, para. 1, sentence 2 (if the self-
disclose is to be considered involuntarily, governments clearly have the power, and in 
Germany even the duty, to protect citizens from making such involuntary decisions. The 
GGDA includes regulations that prohibit data collectors from receiving certain sensitive 
data, like genetic data); German Federal Data Protection Act [GFDPA], § 28, para. 3(b) 
(prohibits rendering consent invalid); German Federal Data Protection Act [GFDPA], § 
28(a), para. 2, sentence 4 (also prohibits rendering consent invalid) (Ger.); European 
Union General Data Protection Regulation [EUGDPR], Jan. 25, 2012 at art. 7, § 4, (original 
draft declared consent to be invalid in case of a “significant imbalance between the position 
of the data subject and the controller”) (Ger.); Employee Polygraph Protection Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 2002 (1988) (which prohibits employers (with a few exceptions) to use, accept, 
refer to, or inquire concerning the results of any lie detector test an employee or 
prospective employee has undertaken) (in determining whether disclosure is involuntary, 
for practical reasons and to achieve legal certainty, governments may use simplifying 
categories (age/certain dangerous situations) as long as they are reasonable). 
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ones, German and U.S. law might lead to different assessments as to 
which acts of self-disclosure are to be regarded as voluntary. In this 
article, we opt for a broad reading, according to which all acts of self-
disclosure, except for the three named exceptions which are seen as 
voluntary to allow a comprehensive analysis of all potentially relevant 
legal questions. 
B. HARM TO SELF-DEVELOPMENT CAUSED BY ONLINE
SELF-DISCLOSURE 
 A lack of privacy may cause harms to the individuals themselves. 
Individuals’ cognitive processes depend on unbiased and unrestricted 
access to information and an uninhibited development of ideas. Self-
disclosure can harm this process in various ways, which will be 
analyzed in the following paragraphs. 
I. Effects of Filter Bubbles on the Selection of Information 
 The creation of new ideas is based on the available information. 
The search for information is now in large part conducted online. 
A 2010 study of the Pew Research Center found that 34 percent of the 
participants had consumed news online on the day before, while 
17 percent had read an online news magazine.11 Forty-seven percent 
used search engines at least once a week to retrieve news, while 
17 percent did so daily. Additionally, 16 percent regularly used social 
networks to receive news, while 26 percent sometimes did so. Also, 
eleven percent used blogs to get news on a regular basis, while 
24 percent sometimes did so.12 
 The primary way to access information online is via search 
engines. The algorithms in search engines aim to recognize 
correlations between information and thereby optimize the displayed 
results. According to Professor Christopher Yoo: “It is thus hard to see 
how to make sense of criticisms that search engine results are 
ʽbiasedʼ when bias is the very essence of the enterprise.”13 However, 
11 See Americans Spending More Time Following the News: Ideological News Sources: 
Who Watches and Why, THE PEW RESEARCH CENTER FOR THE PEOPLE & THE PRESS 105 
(2010), http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/652.pdf. 
12 Id. at 93, 119. 
13 See Christopher Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an Unintermediated 
Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 708 (2010). 
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even the very essence of an enterprise must face criticism if it has the 
potential to cause harm. 
 Entering a search query and accessing a website can be activities 
that disclose the users’ thoughts.14 While users are searching for 
information online, website operators and internet service providers 
can store the URL of the accessed websites, search engine operators 
can record the searched items and accessed hits, and email providers 
can retain email metadata.15 Similarly the documentation of the search 
for information creates “intellectual records”, which provide a “partial 
transcript of the operation of a human mind”.16 Among other uses they 
are put to, these records are analyzed to support or influence users by 
providing them with personalized content and advertising. 
 When ranking search engine hits, the algorithms take into 
consideration personalized factors17 to estimate which hits are likely to 
be considered relevant by the users.18 For users, great importance lies 
with the content of the first page(s), as the effort required to access 
14 See Ira S. Rubinstein et al., Data Mining and Internet Profiling: Emerging Regulatory 
and Technological Approaches, 75 CHI. L. REV. 261, 272 (2008) (pointing out that 
“Internet searches raise significant privacy concerns because they can represent the most 
intimate and spontaneous of one’s online activities. An internet search reflects unvarnished 
thoughts and ponderings rather than one’s more considered communications or 
transactions.”); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 204 (2006) (summarizing that 
“[c]uriosity is monitored, producing a searchable database of the curious. […] Before 
search engines, no one had any records of curiosity; there was no list of questions asked.”). 
15 See Kurt Opsahl, Why Metadata Matters, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (June 7, 
2013), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/why-metadata-matters (“They know you 
rang a phone sex service at 2:24 am and spoke for 18 minutes. But they don’t know what 
you talked about. They know you called the suicide prevention hotline from the Golden 
Gate Bridge. But the topic of the call remains a secret. They know you spoke with an HIV 
testing service, then your doctor, then your health insurance company in the same hour. 
But they don’t know what was discussed. They know you called a gynecologist, spoke for a 
half hour, and then called the local Planned Parenthood’s number later that day. But 
nobody knows what you spoke about.”). 
16 Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 436 (2008). 
17 See, e.g., Martin Feuz et al., Personal Web Searching in the Age of Semantic Capitalism: 
Diagnosing the Mechanisms of Personalization, 16 FIRST MONDAY (2011) (this 
personalized search also takes into account statistical data about age groups, location, 
financial situation, etc.; the displayed search results are even modified in areas where there 
is no prior search history of the individual user). 
18 See ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE 10 (2012) (search engine personalization may even 
influence the total number of displayed results; in this example, two users searching the 
same term in Google received 180 million and 139 million hits respectively).  
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results further down the line means those results can be regarded as 
de facto non existent. For example, when searching Google for “BP”, 
some users might primarily see information about investment 
possibilities at the oil company BP, while others will be lead to 
information about the oil tragedy caused by BP.19 Similarly, the 
algorithms of social networks decide whom to show which 
information at what position.20 If left-wing oriented users do not see 
posts of their conservative friends and vice versa,21 information about 
alarming drawbacks may not be noticed or situations may appear 
distorted, as users may only learn about the arguments of one side. 
 Instead of coming to know other opinions, users may get caught in 
“feedback loops”22 which create “echo chambers of thought”23 and 
isolate them from opposing ideas. A “filter bubble” is created,24 and 
users are manipulated by algorithms. Professor Lawrence Lessig 
notes: “The observing will affect the observed. The system watches 
what you do; it fits you into a pattern; the pattern is fed back to you in 
form of options set by the pattern; the options reinforce the pattern; 
the cycle begins again”.25 
 Such a personalization can be used to enforce political or 
economic interests. Whereas readers of a left-wing newspaper will be 
well aware of a political bias within the articles, online users usually 
are ignorant of the omnipresent pre-selection of sources by 
algorithms.26 This lack of transparency in addition to the missing 
chance to opt-out of personalization leaves users with no way to 
 
 
 
 
19 Id. at 10. 
20 See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913 (2013). 
21 See ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE 13 (2012) (describing that this occurred to him). 
22 See Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It’s Not Privacy, And It’s Not Fair, 66 STAN. 
L. REV.  35 (2013). 
23 See Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Three Paradoxes of Big Data, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 41, 44 (2013). 
24 See Eli Pariser, The Filter Bubble, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 10 2010), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/daily-dish/archive/2010/10/the-filter-bubble/181427/ 
(defining the filter bubble as a “personal ecosystem of information that’s been catered by 
these algorithms to who they think you are”); see also ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE 17 
(2012); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1917 (2013). 
25 Lawrence Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 220 (2006). 
26 See ELI PARISER, FILTER BUBBLE, supra note 18, at 18 (2012).  
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escape from this interference with their gathering of information. 
Further research is impeded, as it seems as if all necessary 
information is received. Eli Pariser gives an allegory: If your plate is 
filled with delicious information, why would you want to look 
further?27 Users thus can be subtly steered in one direction and, 
thereby, be hindered in forming an autonomous opinion. 
II. Inhibiting Effects on the Access to Information 
 In addition to being imperceptibly withheld from accessing 
information that does not suit their profiles, users might abstain 
completely from accessing certain information to avoid negative 
consequences. 
 Until recently, information that was once disclosed was likely to be 
forgotten as time passed by. Though it may have been stored 
somewhere in a newspaper archive or a book, it was practically 
obscure,28 as described in a concurring opinion in United States v. 
Jones: “In the pre-computer age, the greatest protections of privacy 
were neither constitutional nor statutory, but practical. Traditional 
surveillance for any extended period of time was difficult and costly 
and therefore rarely undertaken.”29 Due to technical developments, 
vast amounts of data are now collected and processed by countless 
parties and are available and accessible for an unlimited period of 
time. Thereby, such “dataveillance”30 creates an impression of being 
watched similar to traditional physical forms of surveillance.31 
 Humans are embedded in their social environment and therefore 
eager to leave positive impressions on everyone who observes them. 
People might aim at appearing likeable, intelligent, smart and 
foresighted, and at hiding mistakes and changes of mind. Thus, the 
27 Id. at 102. 
28 See United States Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 
U.S. 749, 762 (1989) (acknowledging a privacy interest in maintaining such practical 
obscurity). 
29 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 963 (2012). 
30 See Roger Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, ROGERCLARK.COM (Nov. 
1987), http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/CACM88.html (introducing the term 
“dataveillance”). 
31 See James P. Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2003); Daniel J. Solove, “I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and Other 
Misunderstandings of Privacy, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 745, 765 (2007). 
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impression of being watched can alter the individuals’ behavior, as 
Professor Christopher Slobogin notes: “Imagine now being watched by 
an officer […] every time you walk through certain streets. Say you 
want to run (to catch a bus, for a brief bit of exercise or just for the hell 
of it). Will you? Or assume you want to obscure your face (because of 
the wind or a desire to avoid being seen by an officious acquaintance)? 
How about hanging out on the street corner (waiting for friends or 
because you have nothing else to do)? In all of these scenarios, you 
will probably feel and perhaps act differently than when the officer is 
not there. Perhaps your hesitancy comes from uncertainty as to the 
officer’s likely reaction or simply from a desire to appear completely 
law-abiding; the important point is that it exists.”32 
 As users cannot foresee who is watching them and what activities 
the watchers might (today or any day in the future) perceive as 
negative, it is likely that users will limit themselves to the least-risky 
behavior and “conformistically” stick with the mainstream.33 
Regardless of the question whether users in fact are watched at a given 
time, the mere fear of being watched can alter their behavior as it does 
with the panopticon’s prisoners. 
 Such a self-censorship as a result of the fear of being watched is 
well-recognized by the German Federal Constitutional Court, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht.34 The court based the necessity to develop 
a right to informational self-determination precisely on these findings: 
“If citizens cannot oversee and control which or even what kind of 
information about them is openly accessible in their social 
environment, and if they cannot even appraise the knowledge of 
possible communication partners, they may be inhibited in making 
use of their freedom. If citizens are unsure whether dissenting 
behavior is noticed and information is being permanently stored, used 
and passed on, they will try to avoid dissenting behavior so as not to 
 
 
 
 
32 See Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the 
Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 241 (2002).  
33 See also Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 
1193, 1216 (1998); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 108-109 (2009).  
34 See BVerfGE, June 11, 1958, 7, 377 (378) (Ger.);  BVerfGE, July 14, 1999, 100, 313 (381) 
(Ger.); BVerfGE, Mar. 3, 2004, 109, 279 (354) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Feb. 27, 2008, 120, 274 
(323) (Ger.); BVerwG, Aug. 22, 2006, NJW 2007, 351 (354) (Ger.). 
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attract attention. They may even abstain from making use of their 
basic and human rights.”35 
 If users are made uncomfortable by the thought that someone 
could come to know that they accessed certain online resources, the 
described self-censorship might inhibit their access to controversial 
resources. A 2013 study asked 528 U.S.-journalists whether fear of 
online surveillance had changed their research behavior. Sixteen 
percent stated that this fear had actually made them not search for 
certain terms in search engines or not access certain websites, 
twelve percent said they had considered to refrain from these 
actions.36 
 A lack of informational privacy may thus constrain the users’ 
access to information outside the mainstream. 
III. Inhibiting Effects on the Creation of Ideas 
 Besides the non-biased access to resources and the possibility to 
use them without fear, the possibility to think without being watched 
and to discuss with trusted persons is crucial to develop new ideas. 
 The creation of ideas depends on the individual’s freedom to 
consider and reject a variety of ways (including unorthodox ones), and 
to change opinion until the final product is ready to be shared with the 
environment.37 
 Both the process of thinking and the exchange with trusted 
persons are to a large degree mediated by online services. Documents 
are stored in the cloud, ideas are noted in online diaries, and thoughts 
get exchanged via emails, chats or blogs. Society faces a “migration of 
thought […] to the electronic environment”.38 
 A feeling of being watched during these processes hinders the 
creation of ideas. As Professor Paul M. Schwartz notes, “perfected 
surveillance of naked thought’s digital expression short-circuits the 
35 BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (42) (Ger.); Gerrit Hornung & Christoph Schnabel, Data 
protection in Germany I: The population census decision and the right to informational 
self-determination, 25 COMPUTER L. & SECURITY REV. 84, 85 (2009). 
36 See FDR Group, The Impact of U.S. Government Surveillance on Writers: Findings 
from a Survey of PEN Membership, PEN AMERICA (Oct. 31, 2013), 
http://www.pen.org/sites/default/files/Chilling%20Effects_PEN%20American.pdf. 
37 See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, More Essential Than Ever: The Fourth Amendment in 
the Twenty First Century 12 (Geoffrey R. Stone, ed., 2012). 
38 Richards, supra note 16, at 444. 
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individual’s own process of decision-making.”39 To avoid negative 
consequences, self-censorship may therefore limit ideas to conformist 
views, the well-recognized and the mainstream.40 Thus, individuals 
may turn “boring”.41 Additionally, they might refrain from sharing 
controversial ideas with trusted persons to avoid negative 
consequences for the latter. 
 Thus, Professor Julie E. Cohen calls for “informational 
autonomy”,42 and Professor Daniel J. Solove calls for “free zones for 
individuals to flourish”.43 Furthermore, one needs to be able to discuss 
preliminary ideas with trusted persons to receive feedback, and be 
able to keep, change or withdraw the idea accordingly. Professor Neil 
M. Richards describes an “infant industries’ rationale, serving to 
nurture and shield new ideas from social disapproval before they are 
ready to be disclosed.”44 To avoid thoughts to be inhibited, he calls for 
the protection of intellectual privacy, claiming that “the protection of 
records of our intellectual activities […] safeguards the integrity of our 
intellectual activities by shielding them from the unwanted gaze or 
interference of others.”45 
IV. Conclusion 
 A biased or inhibited access to resources as well as a restricted 
ability to freely evolve ideas hinders individuals from developing their 
personality. Conformist ideas hence lead to conformist behavior. 
39 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1656 
(1999). 
40 See also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1425 (2000); Lilian Mitrou, The impact of communications 
data retention on fundamental rights and democracy – the case of the EU Data Retention 
Directive, in SURVEILLANCE AND DEMOCRACY 133 (Kevin D. Haggerty & Minas Samatas, 
eds., 2010). 
41 Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1948 (2013). 
42 See Cohen, supra note 40, at 1425. 
43 See Solove, supra note 31, at 762. 
44 See Richards, supra note 16, at 404. 
45 Id. at 387; see also Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 448 
(1980); Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 576 (2003) 
(describing intellectual privacy as “the extent of ʽbreathing spaceʼ  both metaphorical and 
physical, available for intellectual activity”). 
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Additionally, the potential for economic success through new ideas 
and business models gets impaired. 
 Therefore, even voluntary disclosure, despite all its obvious 
advantages, can cause great harm to the individuals themselves. 
C. TWO PATERNALISTIC APPROACHES TO PREVENT ONLINE SELF-
DISCLOSURE 
 To fight the described risks caused by excessive self-disclosure, 
governments may wish to completely prevent46 certain disclosures. 
 In doing so, they may of course focus only on assisting users to 
manage their own privacy. As these measures do not infringe upon the 
users’ rights, governments may always apply them. Under German 
law, the government is even constitutionally obliged to help users to 
protect themselves.47 This idea of privacy self-management48 is based 
on empowering users to make their own decision about self-disclosure 
based on their own cost-benefit-analysis. Tools to achieve this are 
traditionally and primarily based on increasing transparency by 
notice, especially through information requirements or privacy 
policies which inform users about the collection and use of their data. 
Other examples would be the concepts of privacy by design, including 
privacy-enhancing technologies which integrate privacy protection 
46 European Union General Data Protection Regulation [EUGDPR], Jan. 25, 2012, art. 17 
(describing that another, less invasive but also less effective, option would be to soften the 
effects of self-disclosure, e.g., by enacting strict rules on data security, or by strengthening 
the users’ rights to correct or delete certain information (an example would be a “right to 
be forgotten”)) (Ger.); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Right to be Forgotten, 64 STAN. L. REV. 
88, 88 (2012) (elaborating on a critical U.S. perspective). 
47 Grundgesetz [GG] [Basic Law], Art. 1, para. 1, Art. 2, para 1, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html (detailing a duty to protect the 
users’ right to informational self-determination) (Ger.); see BVerwG Oct. 23, 2006, MMR 
2007, 93 (93) (to fulfill a duty to protect users’ right to informational self-determination, 
the German government must set a legal framework that allows users to decide in a self-
determined way whether to disclose their data. This case lays out the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht reasons that the government has to ensure that individuals can 
participate in communication processes self-determinedly by empowering them to 
undertake effective informational self-protection) (Ger.). 
48 See Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013) (also uses the term “privacy self-management”). 
2016] SANDFUCHS AND KAPSNER 197 
into a service or process.49 Further, privacy education can assist users 
in making informed choices according to their preferences. 
 Governments can promote such privacy self-management by 
providing the necessary infrastructure, incentivizing or supporting its 
development, ensuring its legal enforceability, or offering a privacy 
audit service.50 Professor Gregory Mitchell describes such 
interventions as “liberty-focused paternalis[m]”, which prefers 
individual freedom over objective welfare, and is “happy to trust free 
individuals to make their own welfare decisions and let them live with 
the consequences” (thereby rejecting the idea of libertarian 
paternalism, to be discussed below).51 Government measures to 
promote privacy self-management are characterized by the 
governments’ primary goal to empower individuals to make their own 
decision, without aiming to steer users in a specific direction.  
 This paper is concerned with a more effective – though more 
difficult to justify – path: to prevent certain disclosures by 
paternalistic measures. When doing so, governments may pursue two 
different ways.  Governments may pursue either a traditional 
paternalistic approach of compelling protection, or the more modern 
libertarian-paternalistic approach of nudging. 
I. Compelled Protection 
 The most effective way to prevent self-disclosure is to compel 
users toward not disclosing certain aspects of their informational 
privacy. The government decides which disclosures generally bear 
more risks than benefits and prevents such disclosures. This can be 
accomplished in two different ways, which both de facto result in less 
self-disclosure: 
 Firstly, government could forbid users to disclose their data and 
thereby render online self-disclosure impossible. 
49 See Enabling smarter privacy tools for the web, PLATFORM FOR PRIVACY PREFERENCES 
PROJECT (Nov. 20, 2007) (examples include anonymous/pseudonymous services, 
encryption, a consistent and legally binding do-not-track-standard, tools to block certain 
scripts or cookies, proxy-servers, or P3P-agents that compare the users’ privacy 
preferences with a website’s machine readable privacy policy to enable users to make an 
informed decision about whether to access the website or not). 
50 See German Federal Data Protection Act [GFDPA] § 9a (a basis for the implementation 
of such an audit in Germany) (Ger.).  
51 See Gregory Mitchell, Libertarian Paternalism Is an Oxymoron, FSU College of Law, 
Law and Economics Paper No. 05-02 at 31. 
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 Secondly, data collectors could be prohibited from collecting or 
using revealed data, even if users would like to share them. To make 
certain data collection/use impossible, data collectors may 
additionally be forced to change their codes52 in ways that disclosure 
would be technically impossible. 
 An example for preventing explicit self-disclosure would be to 
prohibit the collection or use of sensitive data such as genetic data. 
Implicit disclosure could be prevented by prohibiting certain kinds of 
browser tracking (even with users’ consent). The data collectors would 
then be forced to accordingly change their codes. 
 Compelling protection has been the traditional approach of 
governments all around the world to prevent all sorts of dangers their 
citizens face. 
II. Nudges 
 A second way that currently receives great attention from scholars 
is to prevent users from self-disclosure by using nudges (see E III for 
the libertarian paternalistic justification of nudges).53 
 Findings of behavioral psychology show that users are predictably 
irrational.54 When facing complicated situations, rational decisions 
are replaced by simplifying models, approximation strategies or 
heuristics.55 Scholars suggest measures that would prevent or limit 
irrational decisions (debiasing through law).56 An example would be a 
legal command to use so-called libertarian paternalistic measures 
52 According to Professor Lawrence Lessig, the regulation of cyberspace is governed by 
code (understood as hardware and software), the architecture of cyberspace, see Lessig, 
Code supra note 14, at 5 et seq. While he relies on the market directing this code, for the 
purpose of this paper, regulation of code by law is considered a way of compelled 
protection. 
53 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT 
HEALTH, WEALTH AND HAPPINESS (2008). 
54 See Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces That Shape Our Decisions 
(2010). 
55 See Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, What Can Behavioral Economics Teach Us 
About Privacy? in DIGITAL PRIVACY: THEORY TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 364, 369 
(Alessandro Acquisti ed., 2008). 
56 See Christine Jolls, Rationality and Consent in Privacy Law, at 54 et seq. (2010), 
available at http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic503720.files/Jolls%203%2017.pdf. 
2016] SANDFUCHS AND KAPSNER 199 
such as nudges.57 Such tools are paternalistic because the government 
decides what is best for the citizens. Thereby they are treated as an 
object of government decision-making. Simultaneously, the measures 
are supposed to be somewhat libertarian, as citizens are left with the 
possibility to act differently from what they are nudged to do.58 
Knowledge about irrationalities in decision-making can be used to 
design choice architectures for users in a way they are likely to decide 
as the architect intends them to decide.59 There is a wide variety of 
possible privacy nudges. 
 A very basic example is the use of privacy-enhancing defaults. 
People are more likely to keep a status quo than to initiate changes.60 
Taking this into consideration, the use of privacy by default could lead 
to a substantially lower degree of self-disclosure. 
 Also, providing users with feedback before or after committing 
mistakes can decrease the probability of such errors. A non-
representative study initially surveyed that users often regret having 
made their Facebook posts available to an overly large audience. To 
prevent them from committing those mistakes, before being able to 
post or comment on Facebook, users were confronted with five 
pictures of other users who would be able to view the post.61 The pre-
study further indicated that users frequently regret having posted 
excessively emotional posts or comments. To impede them from doing 
so, before being able to send an emotional post or comment the users 
were shown a note. For example, “Other people might perceive your 
57 Scholars have suggested various terms, see Rhys Jones, Jessica Pykett & Mark 
Whitehead, Governing Temptation: Changing Behaviour in an Age of Libertarian 
Paternalism, 35 PROGRESS IN HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 483 (2011) (“behaviour change 
policies”); Mario J. Rizzo & Douglas G. Whitman, Little Brother is Watching You: New 
Paternalism on the Slippery Slopes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 685, 685 (2009) (“new paternalism”), 
and Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541 et seq. (1998) (“anti-antipaternalism”). 
58 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Storrs Lectures: Behaviour Economics and Paternalism, 122 
YALE L.J. 1826, 1835 (2013). 
59 See Thaler & Sunstein, Nudge, supra note 53, at 89 et seq. 
60 See Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1174 et seq. (2003). 
61 See Yang Wang et al., From Facebook Regrets to Facebook Privacy Nudges, 74 OHIO ST. 
L.J. 1307, 1321 (2013). 
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post as negative”.62 Both models induced users to not publish the post, 
change the audience, or modify their privacy settings. 
 Additionally, a variety of other incentives can be used to trigger 
privacy-enhancing behavior. People suffer from optimism-bias and 
thus systematically overrate the probability of the occurrence of 
positive events while underestimating the one of negative events. For 
example, in the context of social networks users know about privacy 
problems, but expect not to be affected by them.63 Moreover, if a harm 
is hard to imagine, like identity theft, people underestimate the 
probability of its occurrence.64 These predictable irrationalities can be 
used to alter behavior by drawing users’ attention to certain factors. 
Users could be prevented from implicitly compromising their 
informational privacy on privacy-invading websites if those websites 
had to display an avatar which follows the user. With one click, users 
could either fade out the avatar or opt-out of the tracking.65 
 Moreover, the way different alternatives are framed affects the 
decisions that are made by users. The option “Click here for 
continuous surveillance” will appear less attractive to the user than 
“Click here for more relevant advertising”.66 As the design of a website 
can influence the decision whether to trust the website or not, 
changing the design while leaving the content unchanged can be used 
to prevent users from excessive self-disclosure. 
 Another privacy-enhancing nudge could be to increase transaction 
costs. For example, while the revealing of most kinds of personal data 
62 Id. at 1322. Nevertheless, follow-up interviews showed that participants disliked the 
emotional feedback tool, see id. at 1327 et. seq. So far, scholars seem to have paid little 
attention to the fact that many privacy-enhancing nudges imply privacy invading 
technologies, such as analyzing the content of posts to estimate if it is emotional. 
63 See Alessandro Acquisti & Ralph Gross, Imagined Communities: Awareness, 
Information Sharing, and Privacy on the Facebook, at 13-14 (2006), available at 
http://www.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/papers/acquisti-gross-facebook-privacy-PET-
final.pdf. 
64 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55. 
65 Professor Ryan Calo describes this tool as part of his concept of “visceral notice.” Other 
than content-neutral notice, the tool seems more appropriately considered as using 
behavioral economic insights to change behavior and therefore in this paper is listed as a 
nudge rather than a notice, but see M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy 
(and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1027, 1040 (2012). 
66 See Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Consent to Behavioural Targeting in European Law: 
What are the Policy Implications to Insights from Behavioural Economics?, at 51 (draft for 
the Privacy Law Scholars Conference (Berkeley July 2013)). 
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would only require one click, the disclosure of sensitive data could 
afford either several clicks or even signing and mailing a consent 
form.67 Also, a mandatory waiting period before a taken decision 
comes into effect could limit disclosure. Based on pre-study findings 
that users frequently regret rushed Facebook posts, the above 
mentioned non-representative study tested a ten-second waiting 
period before a post or comment would be published.68 The feature, 
when given, allowed users to wait, edit the post, delete the post or skip 
the waiting. Several users thus edited posts or refrained from 
publishing a post at all.69 
The line between promotion of privacy self-management and nudges 
sometimes turns blurry. However, it seems preferable to differentiate 
measures that do not aim at altering the decision (promotion of 
privacy self-management) and those that serve to modify the decision 
(nudges). Such a distinction proves especially necessary as the law 
treats both kinds of measures differently.70 
D.  GOVERNMENTAL DUTY TO PATERNALISTICALLY PREVENT ONLINE
SELF-DISCLOSURE 
 In the face of the described harms that self-disclosure can cause,71 
both the German and the U.S. government could be thought to be 
constitutionally obliged to use compelled protection or nudges to 
prevent competent adult users from certain acts of voluntary self-
disclosure to safeguard the endangered constitutional rights, i.e. the 
users’ interests in their free access to information and the unhindered 
development of their personalities. 
67 See id. at 56. 
68 See Wang et al., supra note 61, at 1321-1322. 
69 See id. at 1328-1329. 
70 For the legal situation in the United States, see, e.g., Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (a duty to convey purely 
factual and uncontroversial information faces a low scrutiny), but see R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (graphic warnings 
on cigarette packages face intermediate scrutiny). 
71 See B. 
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I.   Analysis: German Constitutional Law 
 German basic rights are not limited to the function of protecting 
individuals against the government, but also create a so called 
objective order of values that serves as a constitutional basis for all 
areas of the law (“objektive Wertordnung”).72 Therefore, the law as 
such (including civil law) has to be interpreted in the light of the basic 
rights. Against this background, the doctrine of a duty to protect has 
been developed. If private actors threaten the basic rights of 
individuals who cannot defend themselves the individuals’ basic rights 
may oblige the government to protect them from the other private 
actors (“Schutzpflicht”).73 
 When choosing the desired level of protection and the means used 
to achieve this protection, the government can act at its own 
discretion (“Gestaltungsspielraum”).74 However, it must not refrain 
from taking any action or take evidently insufficient measures 
(“Untermaßverbot”).75 
As self-disclosure may cause harms to the development of the users’ 
personality, the government could be obliged to prevent users from 
excessive self-disclosure in order to protect them. 
 In a few cases, courts have held that the government was obliged 
to protect citizens from harms caused by their own voluntary conduct. 
Above all, those cases involved the protection of the citizens’ human 
dignity.76 It was held to be endangered by a woman dancing in a peep 
72 See BVerfGE, Jan. 15, 1958, 7, 198 (205) (Ger.). 
73 See BVerfGE, Feb. 25, 1975, 39, 1 (42) (protection of the unborn child against abortion) 
(Ger.); BVerfGE, May 28, 1993, 88, 203 (252) (same) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Oct. 16, 1977, 46, 
160 (164-165) (protection against terrorism) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Aug. 1, 1978,49, 24 
(53 et seq.) (same) (Ger.); BVerwG Dec. 20, 1979, 53, 30 (Ger.); BVerfGE, Aug. 8, 1978, 49, 
89 (142) (protection against technical and environment dangers) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Dec. 20, 
1979, 53, 30 (57) (same) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Jan. 14, 1981, 56, 54 (73, 78) (same) (Ger.); 
BVerfGE, Oct. 29, 1987, 77, 170 (214) (same) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Nov. 30, 1988, 79, 174 (201-
202) (same) (Ger.). 
74 See BVerfGE, Oct. 29, 1987, 77, 170 (215) (Ger.). 
75 See BVerfGE, May 28, 1993, 88, 203 (254 et seq.) (Ger.). 
76 See Art. 1 para. 1 Basic Law, translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0015 (Ger.). 
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show, and77 by a growth-restricted person who wanted to be tossed as 
part of a commercial dwarf tossing game (“Zwergenwerfen”).78 
 However, paternalistic protections of human dignity (and even 
more regarding other legal interests) have been widely criticized.79  In 
more recent cases, the Bundesverfassungsgericht did not acknowledge 
duties to protect competent adult individuals from menaces caused by 
themselves, but held that basic rights are only meaningfully protected 
if they allow individuals to endanger themselves80, to reject treatment 
of curable diseases,81 etc. 
 Similarly, the Bundesverfassungsgericht held government 
intervention with the sole aim of improving individuals to be 
unacceptable, for example when the court rejected government 
measures to place competent adult persons in mental hospitals with 
the sole goal of making them (in the eyes of government) a better 
person.82 
 Informational privacy is not necessarily protected by the users’ 
human dignity, and thus the courts’ widely criticized rulings on a 
government duty to protect human dignity may only in few instances 
(such as disclosing especially intimate personal data) indicate a 
possibility to protect users against themselves. But even in these cases 
a duty to protect has, in accordance with the views of the 
overwhelming majority of scholars, to be rejected. A society such as 
the German one, which even no longer prohibits prostitution a fortiori 
certainly does not acknowledge a government duty to limit online self-
disclosure of intimate data. 
 Furthermore, the idea of protecting persons from their own 
voluntary actions contradicts their freedom to informational self-
77 See BVerwGE, Dec 15, 1981, 64, 274 (277 et seq.). (Ger.) The decision has widely been 
rejected in scholarship, see, e.g., Wolfgang Schatzschneider, ‘Rechtsordnung und 
Prostitution’ NJW 1985, 2793, 2796-2797 (Ger.). 
78 See Verwaltungsgericht Neustadt [Administrative Court Neustadt] May 21, 1992, NVwZ 
1993, 98, 99 (Ger.). 
79 See, e.g., Eckart Klein, ‘Grundrechtliche Schutzpflicht des Staates’ NJW 1989, 1633, 1640 
(Ger.). 
80 See BVerwG, Nov. 8, 1999, NJW 1999, 3399, 3401 (Ger.). 
81 See BVerfGE, Oct. 7, 1981, 58, 208 (226). 
82 See BVerfGE, July 18, 1967, 22, 180 (219 et seq.) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1970, 30, 47 
(53) (Ger.). 
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determination. Hence, there is no duty to coerce privacy on competent 
adult users to protect themselves. 
II. Analysis: U.S. Constitutional Law 
 Except for the protection against slavery,83 U.S. constitutional law 
does not include any government duties to protect. Such duties were 
rejected in cases where the government knew about the severe abuse 
of a four-year-old child,84 or about the kidnapping of three kids who 
ultimately died, but failed to act on that knowledge.85 A duty for 
government officials to help the victims of accidents was declined 
because “[t]he men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned 
that government might do too little for the people but that it might do 
too much to them.”86 
 Constitutional protection only arises in case of state action.87 
Though various online services serve a tremendously important role in 
the everyday life of citizens, courts have held that internet service 
providers,88 search engines89 and Yahoo! email groups90 cannot be 
considered state actors. 
 Professor Jeffrey Rosen recently called for a “constitutional 
amendment to prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures of our 
persons and electronic effects, whether by the government or by 
private corporations like Google and AT&T.”91 However, this 
83 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883). 
84 See DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
85 See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005). 
86 See Jackson v. City of Joliet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir. 1983). 
87 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11, 13 (“It is State action of a particular character that 
is prohibited. Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter.”). 
88 See Green v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 472 (3d Cir. 2003); Howard v. Am. Online 
Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000); Noah v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 
532, 546 (E.D. Va. 2003); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 948 F.Supp. 436, 
443 (E.D. Pa. 1996). 
89 See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 631-632 (D. Del. 2007). 
90 See Murawski v. Pataki, 514 F. Supp. 2d 577, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
91 See Jeffrey Rosen, Madison’s Privacy Blind Spot, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2014,, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/19/opinion/sunday/madisons-privacy-blind-
spot.html?_r=0 (“[C]ontinuously tracking my location, whether by the government or 
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interesting proposal has been without major consequences so far. 
Constitutional privacy protection in the United States thus is limited 
to repel government intervention – with the exception of the 
California Constitution, which provides privacy protection also against 
private actors.92 
III. Comparison 
 As a basic principle, German and U.S. constitutional law follow 
opposing approaches regarding a government duty to protect. 
 Basic German rights can establish governmental duties to protect 
citizens against private action. By contrast, U.S. law does not 
recognize any duty to interfere with private relationships.93 
 However, in both legal systems there is no governmental duty to 
coerce online privacy. Though the German constitution in general 
acknowledges duties to protect, no duty to coerce or nudge competent 
AT&T, is an affront to my dignity. When every step I take on- and off-line is recorded, so an 
algorithm can predict if I am a potential terrorist or a potential customer, I am being 
objectified and stereotyped, rather than treated as an individual, worthy of equal concern 
and respect.”). 
92 See Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994); see also 
Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., 215 Cal. App. 3d 1034, 1043 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1989) 
(“Common experience with the ever-increasing use of computers in contemporary society 
confirms that the amendment was needed and intended to safeguard individual privacy 
from intrusion by both private and governmental action. That common experience makes 
it only too evident that personal privacy is threatened by the information-gathering 
capabilities and activities not just of government, but of private business as well. If the 
right of privacy is to exist as more than a memory or a dream, the power of both public and 
private institutions to collect and preserve data about individual citizens must be subject to 
constitutional control.”). 
93 Several scholars have conducted comparative analysis between the two systems, all 
agreeing on the finding that the U.S. Constitution cannot be read to include duties to 
protect, see Thomas Giegerich, Privatwirkung der Grundrechte in den U.S.A: Die State 
Action Doctrine des U.S. Supreme Courts und die Bürgerrechtsgesetzgebung des Bundes 
(Springer-Verlag 1992) at 451 et seq.; Friederike V Lange, Grundrechtsbindung des 
Gesetzgebers (Mohr Siebeck 2010) at 416 et seq.; Philipp Wittmann, Der Schutz der 
Privatsphäre vor staatlichen Überwachungsmaßnahmen durch die U.S.-amerikanische 
Bundesverfassung (Nomos 2014) at 38 et seq., but see Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and 
the Reality of American Constitutional Exceptionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 442 et seq. 
(2009) (“[I]f and to the extent that constitutional rights do have less impact on private 
actors in the United States than in other countries rejecting direct horizontality, it is 
neither due to an exceptional, more vertical structural position on the scope of rights nor to 
how the state action doctrine operates. It is exclusively because of substantive differences 
in the rights themselves and their interpretation; that is, not because fewer laws are subject 
to constitutional rights scrutiny but because fewer laws may fail it.”). 
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adult users into not voluntarily disclosing certain data can be derived 
from those. The U.S. Constitution does not state any governmental 
duties to protect whatsoever and hence does not establish a duty to 
coerce (or nudge towards) informational privacy. 
E. GOVERNMENTAL POWER TO PATERNALISTICALLY PREVENT ONLINE
SELF-DISCLOSURE 
 As shown above, neither the German nor the U.S. government 
have the duty to employ coercive or libertarian paternalistic measures 
to protect their citizens’ privacy against voluntary self-disclosure. 
Indeed, it is even questionable whether they have the power to do so, 
as these measures may infringe upon the rights of the citizens. 
I. Analysis Regarding German Constitutional Law 
1. The Need to Justify Any Preventions of Online Self-Disclosure 
 Even though self-disclosure can harm individuals, self-
endangering behavior falls within the scope of the basic rights. 
Government measures to prevent such behavior therefore need to be 
justified.94 The need for justification is not limited to compelled 
protection which renders online self-disclosure impossible. It is 
recognized that constitutional rights may as well be infringed upon by 
government measures that cause an indirect obstruction. Thus, this 
paper argues that nudges call for justification whenever they 
significantly hinder online self-disclosure. While this is certainly the 
case e.g. for nudges that increase transactions costs, one might argue 
that privacy-enhancing defaults do not significantly hinder online self-
disclosure and therefore do not need to be justified. The question 
whether a nudge constitutes an indirect factual disturbance and thus 
needs justification will have to be analyzed by the government in every 
specific case. 
 The basic right to informational self-determination (“Recht auf 
informationelle Selbstbestimmung”) is not explicitly mentioned in the 
Basic Law, but has been developed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
in its famous census decision95 on the basis of Art. 2 para. 1 
(personality right) in conjunction with Art. 1 para. 1 Basic Law 
94 See BVerwG, Nov. 8, 1999, NJW 1999, 3399, 3401 (Ger.). 
95 See BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (43) (Ger.).  
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(human dignity).96 The right to informational self-determination 
protects against unbounded collection, storage, application, and 
transmission of personal data and affords individuals the right to 
decide about the disclosure and processing of their personal data.97 
Any government action that limits the users’ rights to decide 
themselves about the disclosure and processing of their personal data 
infringes upon this right. It is contended whether the right also 
protects against inhibiting effects that are caused by the mere fear of 
being under surveillance, thereby granting protection against negative 
feelings. Recent judgments by the Bundesverfassungsgericht seem to 
favor such a broad reading.98 
 As individuals are embedded in their social environment and 
depend on communication with others, the right to informational self-
determination cannot create limitless protection.99 It can be 
constrained if outbalanced by a public interest,100 i.e. if there is a 
statute which aims at a legitimate purpose and does not 
disproportionally restrict the right in order to reach the purpose. 
Therefore, a measure is only proportionate if it is suitable 
(“Geeignetheit”), necessary (“Erforderlichkeit”), and appropriate to 
reach the goal (“Angemessenheit”).101 
 Government action which interferes with the right to 
informational self-determination is only constitutional if justified. 
State measures to compel privacy protection or nudge users into 
disclosing less, even for the sake of protecting individuals, therefore 
have to be justified if they significantly hinder online self-disclosure. 
96 Art. 2 para. 1 Basic Law, translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0015. 
97 See BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (43) (Ger.). 
98 See BVerfGE, Apr. 12, 2005, 113, 29 (46-47) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Mar. 2, 2006, 115, 166 
(188) (Ger.); BVerfGE, Mar 11, 2008, 120, 378 (402) (Ger.). 
99 See BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (44) (Ger.). 
100 See BVerfGE, Dec. 1565, 1983, 1 (44) (Ger.). 
101 See, e.g., BVerfGE, Apr. 7, 1964, 17, 306 (314) (Ger.). 
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2. Are the Measures Justified? 
 It has been demonstrated that there is no duty to prevent users 
from voluntarily disclosing data (see D). A government intervention to 
do so has to be justified by an outbalancing legitimate interest. 
 One could argue that the protection of competent adult users 
against the harms caused by their own self-disclosure could itself 
serve as an outbalancing legitimate interest: in very few instances, 
protecting persons against harms caused by their own voluntary 
behavior has been regarded as such an outbalancing interest. The 
Bundesverfassungsgericht did so to justify in one case a statute 
outlawing living organ transplantations between strangers.102 This 
decision was however widely criticized by scholars.103 
 The idea of protecting individuals against their own voluntary 
behavior needs to be rejected. Doing so would pervert the idea of 
liberty inherent in the basic rights. Basic rights guarantee the freedom 
to define for oneself how to live, and which moral values to accept. In 
particular, the right to informational self-determination guarantees 
the freedom to disclose personal information. Protecting users from 
the harms caused by their own conduct cannot be regarded a 
legitimate purpose and therefore cannot outbalance the users’ right to 
informational self-determination. 
 Hence, the question whether a measure to prevent self-disclosure 
is constitutional does not depend on how restrictive the measure is. 
Nudges in most cases are a less restrictive mean than compelled 
protection, but still lack a legitimate government interest if they only 
aim at protecting the users against harms caused by their own 
voluntary conduct. Protecting users from irrational behavior so far has 
neither by courts nor by scholars been regarded as a legitimate 
interest which would justify overriding free choice under German law. 
A discussion similar to the one currently taking place in the United 
States (see E III) has not evolved. 
 Therefore, neither compelled protection nor nudges which 
significantly hinder online self-disclosure can be justified if their only 
goal is to protect competent adult users against harms caused by 
themselves. 
102 See BVerwG, Aug 11, 1999, NJW 1999, 3399, 3400 (Ger.). 
103 See Thomas Gutmann, Gesetzgeberischer Paternalismus ohne Grenzen?, NJW 1999, 
3387, 3387 (Ger.). 
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II. Analysis Regarding U.S. Constitutional Law 
 Preventing online self-disclosure could protect individuals from 
harming themselves. However, these measures may infringe upon the 
users’ rights. As pointed out above (see A), users can voluntarily 
disclose their data online in explicit or implicit ways. Preventing users 
from disclosing certain data could violate their First Amendment 
rights and the Due Process Clause. 
1. First Amendment 
 The First Amendment forbids federal and state104 governments 
from making any law that would abridge the freedom of speech.105 It 
protects both the act of speaking and the act of listening and affords 
individuals the right to publish content online.106 Only the possession, 
consumption, sale, or production of obscene material receives no 
protection,107 unless limited to the home.108 Explicit disclosure which 
does not include obscene material is hence protected by the First 
Amendment. 
 Restrictions of the First Amendment face an intermediate 
scrutiny, if they are limited to time, place, and manner of the 
104 The Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the First Amendment, and it is thus 
applicable also to state governments, see Gitlow v. People of State of N.Y., 268 U.S. 652, 
666 (1925).  
105 Id. 
106 See Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 853 (1997). 
107 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-485 (1957) (“All ideas having even the 
slightest redeeming social importance – unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas 
hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion – have the full protection of the guaranties, 
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important 
interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as 
utterly without redeeming social importance. This rejection for that reason is mirrored in 
the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained, reflected in the international 
agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the 48 States, and in the 20 
obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956.”). 
108 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Whatever may be the justifications for 
other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one’s 
own home. If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the 
power to control men’s minds.”). 
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speech.109 Such government action therefore can only be justified if it: 
1) furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; 2) the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression; and 3) if the incidental restriction on alleged First 
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
furtherance of that interest.110 The prohibition of speech via a variety 
of internet technologies was held to be not a time/place/manner-
restriction, but a content-based restriction.111 A fortiori, preventing 
users from revealing data online, but leaving them with the option to 
do so offline, is a content-based restriction. Such content-based 
measures face strict scrutiny, i.e. they can only be justified if the 
government has a compelling interest and less restrictive alternatives 
would not be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose. 
An example for content-based restrictions is a prohibition to publish 
content online in order to protect minors.112 Prevention of explicit self-
disclosure by compelled protection would infringe upon First 
Amendment rights. 
 A moderate alternative to compelling protection would be to use 
nudges. These could lead to a significant decrease of disclosure. As the 
following examples show, they nonetheless seem not to face First 
Amendment scrutiny, though one could argue that they force 
individuals to listen to ideological government speech. In a Fifth 
Circuit decision, the court had to decide upon the constitutionality of a 
statute which forced women before undertaking an abortion to view 
their fetus in a sonogram, hear the heartbeat, listen to the explanation 
of the results and the procedure, and wait twenty-four hours 
afterwards until the abortion could take place. The court refused the 
argument that such a law would infringe upon the First Amendment 
rights of the women.113 It reasoned, “If the sonogram changes a 
woman’s mind about whether to have an abortion […] that is a 
function of the combination of her new knowledge and her own 
ʽideologyʼ […], not of any ʽideologyʼ inherent in the information she 
109 See Schneider v. State of N.J., Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (prohibition to 
distribute leaflets in certain locations). 
110 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377 (1968). 
111 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 879-880. 
112 See id. at 874. 
113 See Texas Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 576 (5th 
Cir. 2012). 
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has learned about the fetus.”114 Also, the D.C. Circuit Court’s decision 
on images on cigarette packages does not even discuss a possible 
violation of the smokers’ First Amendment rights.115 A few 
commentators suggest affording First Amendment protection against 
measures which aim to alter belief or conduct in an emotional way, 
but only in the rare cases that the affected persons are granted no 
option to opt-out.116 The nudges discussed above (see C) leave choices 
to opt-out and therefore do not face First Amendment scrutiny. 
 In contrast, implicit self-disclosure does not receive First 
Amendment protection at all. The “expression of an idea through 
activity” has been held to be speech, if an “intent to convey a 
particularized message was present, and in the surrounding 
circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”117 Implicit self-disclosure by 
online activities which lead to the collection of data is not aimed at 
conveying a particularized message and thus cannot be regarded as 
speech. Even more, as the users’ consent to the collection of their data 
is not required, users in most occasions might not even be aware of 
the data collection and surely do not intend to convey messages. 
 First Amendment protection could also be triggered as implicit 
self-disclosure allows algorithms to predict which information users 
would like to access, and thus facilitates their access to information. 
Unhindered access to information is a prerequisite for free speech and 
receives First Amendment protection. Limiting implicit disclosure (for 
example by limiting browser tracking) could make it more complex for 
users to find information and hence it could be argued that implicit 
self-disclosure should receive First Amendment protection. However, 
this paper suggests rejecting such a broad reading. Measures that limit 
implicit disclosure would: 1) not affect the information users are 
actually looking for, but only the information they might want to 
access if they knew they were looking for it; and 2) only require 
 
 
 
 
114 Id. at 577. 
115 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
116 See Peter Ferony, Constitutional Law – From Goblins to Graveyards: The Problem of 
Paternalism in Compelled Perception, 35 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 205, 225 et seq. (2013) 
(although he does not dispute the libertarian-paternalistic argument that choice 
architecture would serve the individual). 
117 Spence v. State of Wash., 418 U.S. 405, 410-411 (1974) (display of an American U.S. flag 
marked with a peace symbol during the Vietnam war). 
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additional efforts to find information, not censor anything. The 
situation seems not to be comparable with actual prior restraints or 
censorship, and thus should not be awarded First Amendment 
protection. 
2. Due Process of Law 
 Government measures in the realm of privacy have to respect 
either the high standard of substantive due process of law (strict 
scrutiny) or only the lower standard of procedural due process of law 
(rational basis review). Which standard is applicable depends on the 
respective kind of privacy limitation: 
 Paradoxically, certain government measures to protect privacy can 
also infringe upon the users’ right to privacy. Courts have recognized a 
fundamental right to privacy, which protects against federal 
government intrusion by penumbras surrounding specific guarantees 
in the Bill of Rights.118 These rights are applicable to state 
governments through the incorporation of those guarantees in the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (substantive due 
process).119 Fundamental rights are those rights that are “implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty”,120 and “deeply rooted in this Nation’s 
history and tradition”.121 Government action which restricts the right 
to privacy faces strict scrutiny. The right to privacy however mainly 
protects aspects of decisional privacy,122 like surgical examinations,123 
the use of contraceptives,124 the use of contraceptives by non-married 
118 See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
119 See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1-Due Proc (“nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”). 
120 Palko v. State of Conn., 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 
U.S. 784 (1969). 
121 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977). 
122 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (“One [privacy interest] is the 
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”). 
123 See Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) (“No right is held more 
sacred or is more carefully guarded by the common law than the right of every individual to 
the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of 
others unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”). 
124 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
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couples,125 “inter-racial” marriages,126 abortions,127 sodomy,128 and 
haircuts.129 
 Certain aspects of informational privacy have been held to be 
included in this protection. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized the 
“individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters”130 and 
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the President’s personal 
communications.131 Also, a spousal notification requirement before an 
abortion was found to be likely to prevent a significant number of 
women from obtaining an abortion.132 Following the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s rulings, the majority of Circuit Courts recognized a right to 
informational privacy.133 
 However, the lines of the right to informational privacy remain 
blurry, and courts hesitate to extend the protection of informational 
privacy to fields that have not yet been recognized. As phrased in a 
dissenting opinion in Nelson v. NASA, “Is there a constitutional right 
to informational privacy? Thirty-two terms ago, the Supreme Court 
hinted that there might be and has never said another word about it. 
With no Supreme Court guidance except this opaque fragment, the 
courts of appeals have been left to develop the contours of this free-
floating privacy guarantee on their own. It’s a bit like building a 
125 See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). 
126 See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
127 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992) (citing Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973)).U.S. 
128 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
129 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 250, 153 (1976). 
130 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S.  600 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712-713 (1976) 
(discussing a right to informational privacy but rejecting it for the case at issue in which 
police had distributed leaflets with names and pictures of thieves and the words “Active 
Shoplifters”). 
131 See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 427 (1977). 
132 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa., 505 U.S. at 887-88. 
133 See Barry v. N.Y.C., 712 F.2d 1554, 1559 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Westinghouse 
Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 577-580 (3d Cir. 1980); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 
188, 192 (4th Cir. 1990); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132, 1134 (5th Cir. 1978); J.P. 
v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (6th Cir. 1981) (restrictive); Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673,
684 (6th Cir. 1998) (restrictive); Kimberlin v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 788 F.2d 434, 
437 (7th Cir. 1986); In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999). 
214 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:2 
dinosaur from a jawbone or a skull fragment, and the result looks 
more like a turducken.”134 
 The right to informational privacy so far appears to be limited to 
cases in which citizens wanted to be protected against too much 
government knowledge about private affairs. Government measures to 
1) limit explicit disclosure by using nudges or 2) limit implicit
disclosure by using compelled protection or nudges aim at preventing 
users from disclosing too much. Thus, they seem to be the opposite of 
what has been recognized so far. Neither a right not to be nudged to 
less explicit self-disclosure nor a right not to be prevented from 
implicit self-disclosure has been held to be a fundamental right. Such 
rights do not appear to be deeply rooted in the “Nation’s history and 
tradition.”135 
 Therefore, government acts that nudge towards less explicit self-
disclosure or that restrict implicit disclosure only have to respect 
procedural due process of law and hence must be justified only 
according to the rational basis review.136 
3. Are the Measures Justified? 
 Preventing users from excessive self-disclosure infringes upon 
their rights and needs to be justified. 
 Compelling users to refrain from explicit disclosure interferes with 
their First Amendment rights and faces strict scrutiny. Limiting 
explicit disclosure by nudges or preventing implicit disclosure can be 
justified according to the rational basis review. In both cases, a 
government interest is necessary which is compelling (First 
Amendment) or legitimate (Due Process Clause). Protecting users 
from voluntary self-disclosure which harms themselves would have to 
be a compelling respectively legitimate interest in order to justify the 
measures. 
 When interpreting the First Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court 
states, “The First Amendment mandates that we presume that 
speakers, not the government, know best both what they want to say 
and how to say it. […] To this end, the government, even with the 
purest of motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to 
134 Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865, 878 (9th Cir. 2008). 
135 Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (characterizing fundamental rights). 
136 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 (1938) (introducing the 
rational basis review). 
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speak for that of speakers and listeners; free and robust debate cannot 
thrive if directed by the government.”137 
 Similar ideas can be found regarding the scope of the right to 
privacy. “As a nation […] historically and continuously, we are 
irrevocably committed to the principle that the individual must be 
given maximum latitude in determining his own personal destiny.”138 
 Both decisions are characteristic of the great importance the U.S. 
legal and societal system attaches to the citizens’ freedom of decision. 
U.S. law is shaped by the liberal idea of individual freedom, 
irrespective of how individuals exercise their freedom and with the 
consequence that individuals will have to bear the costs of their 
shortcomings as a price they have to pay for the freedom to commit 
their own mistakes. The legal system is marked by freedom, moral 
diversity, tolerance, and government neutrality, flanked by confidence 
in the free market economy. 
 Protecting autonomous individuals against themselves would be 
the contrary of what the U.S. legal system aims at and thus de lege 
lata should not constitute a legitimate government interest to stand 
rational basis review (however, it has to be admitted that nudging 
could be held to be just a form of enhanced disclosure and enhanced 
consumer control and thus a rational economic interest). 
 Thus, there is no way to justify coercive measures and, at least 
under the current state of law, there also seems little to now way to 
justify nudges. 
III. A Way Out for Libertarian Paternalists? 
 As an exception to the general rule that governments may not 
nudge users towards not disclosing personal data with the only goal of 
protecting their privacy, some libertarian paternalists may deny the 
need to justify their measures as they might not be an infringement 
upon the users’ rights139 in the first place. 
 Based on the general principle of the homo economicus, 
particularly in the United States, scholars call to deploy libertarian 
137 Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988). 
138 Rutherford v. United States, 438 F. Supp. 1287, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (deciding the 
question whether the use of the non admitted medicine Laetrile is protected by the right to 
privacy). 
139 In any case, these measures may infringe upon the data collectors’ rights and thus may 
need justification regarding their rights. As this question does not concern the paternalistic 
aspects of the prevention of self-disclosure, it will not be analyzed in depth in this paper. 
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paternalistic measures to nudge users into limiting self-disclosure to 
what is in their rational interest. Such measures are not regarded to 
endanger the users’ rights, but as an instrument to help users. 
Scholars structure the argument as follows: 
1. Irrational Behavior 
 Neo-classical economic theory is based on the assumption that 
humans are rational actors who know their preferences and aim to 
maximize their utilities. Preferences can include non-monetary goods 
like happiness or the protection of privacy. As alternatives tend to be 
limited, rational actors choose the best available alternative. The 
constrained maximum is reached when marginal costs equal marginal 
benefits, i.e. a raise in costs would not lead to a proportionate raise in 
benefits. 
 The neo-classical view seems not to explain actual privacy 
behavior, though. A majority of U.S. citizens value some kind of 
informational privacy. In a 2012 survey in the United States, in 
exchange for an adequate compensation, between 81 and 93 percent 
of the participants were willing to reveal their gender and civil status, 
but only between 11 and 17 percent agreed to share their browser 
histories or cell phone numbers, and only 4 to 7 percent consented to 
share their cell phone histories or email contacts.140 Furthermore, 
users seem willing to pay higher prices for privacy-enhancing 
products. A non-representative study in the United States showed that 
participants preferred more expensive products if the search engine 
marked them as privacy-enhancing.141 
 Still, users both explicitly and implicitly disclose vast amounts of 
information about themselves, though their costs in protecting 
informational privacy more would be relatively low, as they could for 
example easily disclose less or only to limited audiences or engage in 
privacy self-management. Thus, assuming that users value their 
informational privacy (as indicated by the studies), many act 
differently from what would be in their rational interest. 
140 See Deborah Bothun et al., Consumer privacy: What are consumers willing to share?, 
PWC.COM (May 2012), available at http://www.pwc.com/us/en/industry/entertainment-
media/publications/consumer-intelligence-series/consumer-privacy.html. 
141 The search engine analyzed on the basis of P3P, in how far the websites’ privacy policies 
were in accordance with the users’ preferences, and accordingly marked the websites with 
icons, see Janice Y. Tsai et al., The Effect of Online Privacy Information on Purchasing 
Behavior: An Experimental Study, 22 INFORMATION SYSTEMS RESEARCH 254, 254 et seq. 
(2011), available at http://www.guanotronic.com/~serge/papers/isr10.pdf. 
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 These findings are explainable by the fact that users act 
predictably irrational, as behavioral economists like to put it. 
Individuals have a limited capacity to understand and exploit 
information. If a decision is too complicated, simplifying less accurate 
strategies are used. The complexity of the consequences self-
disclosure can cause may be difficult or impossible to understand for 
users.142 The plurality of data collectors and processors as well as the 
phenomenon of data accumulation can rarely be cognitively captured. 
Even if privacy policies are read, users might suffer from “information 
overload”.143 Professor Helen Nissenbaum describes a “transparency 
paradox” by stating that transparency is reached by detailed 
information, but too much information leads to a lack of 
transparency.144 The marginal benefit of additional information might 
decline or even be negative. Technical innovations are difficult or 
impossible to foresee and consequently users may not be able to judge 
which future uses of their data they want to consent to.145 Amongst 
others, these factors complicate the users’ attempts to understand all 
relevant consequences and to estimate the probability of their 
occurrence.146 And even if users had all relevant information and 
would be able to understand it, behavioral economists argue that 
actual behavior still differs from the behavior of a rational actor. 
2. Correcting the Shortcomings 
 The described findings that users disclose data in predictably 
irrational ways are suggested to serve as a basis to correct these 
irrationalities. 
 Professors Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein claim, “The 
presumption that individual choices should be respected is usually 
based on the claim that people do an excellent job of making choices, 
142 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55, at 364. 
143 See M. Ryan Calo, supra note 65, at 1054. 
144 See Helen Nissenbaum, A Contextual Approach to Privacy Online, DAEDALUS, THE 
JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES 32, 36 (2011). 
145 See also Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, supra note 6, at 153; Solove, supra note 48, at 
1890. 
146 See Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 55; see also James Grimmelmann, Saving 
Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1160 (2009). 
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or at least that they do a far better job than third parties could possibly 
do.”147 
 Based on this assumption, liberal paternalists suggest to only 
respect individual choices if they are rational. If they are not, one 
might alter them to the decision a rational actor would have made.148 
Professor Anita L. Allen proposes “regulatory measures aimed at 
curbing the culture of exposure for the sake of ʽforcingʼ  people to 
love privacy and live privately”,149 without specifying possible 
constitutional justifications. 
 To prevent self-disclosure not in the users’ rational interest, 
libertarian paternalists suggest using the nudges described above 
(see C). The surprising upshot of the libertarian paternalists’ 
argument is that helping users to reach their rational goals even 
though this would mean altering their free decisions would not 
infringe upon their rights. 
3. Libertarian Paternalism as a Justification for Overriding Free 
Choice?150 
 However, this argument does not hold up to a constitutional 
analysis in either Germany or the United States. 
 Libertarian paternalistic measures can help users to make rational 
choices. As long as private actors consult those measures, the users’ 
constitutional rights are not affected as private actors are not bound 
147 Only in a footnote they mention that preserving autonomy could constitute a reason to 
reject paternalism, even if such an autonomy implies errors in decision-making. However, 
they limit this argument immediately: “We do not disagree with the view that autonomy 
has claims of its own, but we believe that it would be fanatical […] to treat autonomy, in the 
form of freedom of choice, as a kind of trump not to be overridden on consequentialist 
grounds.” Cass Sunstein & Richard Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an Oxymoron, 
supra note 60, at 1167 n. 22. 
148 See Gary Lucas, Jr., Saving Smokers From Themselves: The Paternalistic Use of 
Cigarette Taxes, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 693, 718 (2012) (“imperfect rationality still provides a 
basis for paternalism”); and Robert J. Baehr, A New Wave of Paternalistic Tobacco 
Regulation, 95 IOWA L. REV., 1663, 1671-1672 (2010) (justifying warnings on cigarette 
packages). 
149 Allen, Coercing Privacy, supra note 1, at 753. 
150 For a broader discussion of this thought, see Andreas Kapsner & Barbara Sandfuchs, 
Nudging as a Threat to Privacy, 6 REV. OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY 455, 455 et seq. 
(2015); Cass R. Sunstein, Nudges, Agency, and Abstraction: A Reply to Critics, 6 REV. OF 
PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY, 511, 511 et seq. (2015). 
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by them. But what if the government decided to instruct libertarian 
paternalistic measures with the only goal of protecting competent 
users from making free, irrational choices regarding self-disclosure? 
Would this be a legitimate government interest? This paper argues 
that the answer to these questions is no. 
 Competent individuals regularly make decisions which are not in 
their best interest and they have a right to do so. Even if the goal of 
protecting users from making irrational disclosures is a laudable goal, 
doing so would disrespect the users’ free choice. And even if nudges 
do not compel the users, they de facto force them to 
handle/reject/think about the governments’ ideas of how they should 
live their lives. Although this aspect has not received large scholarly 
attention, some commentators notice that libertarian paternalistic 
measures begin “to circumvent traditional, liberal modes of limitation 
on state action and are opening up new registers of legitimate 
government activity”, thereby “justifying the presence of the state in 
everyday life”.151 No matter how the governments’ goals are 
implemented, a situation in which a government decides what is best 
for its citizens has to be classified as paternalistic. 
 The users’ autonomy grants them the right to make their own 
decisions, even if they are non-favorable or they will be regretted later. 
Even a truly irrational self-disclosure remains a free self-disclosure. 
 As long as there is no persuading explanation on why the users’ 
well- being should outweigh their autonomy to make free, but 
disadvantageous decisions, nudging users into making rational 
choices seems not to be justified by a legitimate governmental 
interest. 
 Notwithstanding the authors’ doubts, the legal development in this 
area seems hard to predict. Nudges from the government regarding 
the users’ rights need not withstand First Amendment scrutiny, but 
only rational basis review (see E II). Hence, the measures only need to 
be reasonably related to a legitimate government interest. It seems 
possible that courts acknowledge a government interest to protect 
users from making irrational choices as legitimate and thus hold that 
such measures do not constitute a violation of the users’ rights. 
 Also, as infringements upon the data collectors’ rights call for a 
higher level of justification than infringements upon the users’ rights, 
courts may bypass investigation of violations of the users’ rights and 
only focus on the data collectors’ rights. Nudges will most likely have 
to face the stricter intermediate scrutiny according to the Central 
151 Jones, Pykett and Whitehead, supra note 57, at 483, 486. 
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Hudson test.152 This will be the case if data collectors are obliged to 
engage in compelled speech which is not merely uncontroversial and 
factual, but transports a normative message.153 All compelled speech 
whose primary aim is to convey the government’s opinion on how 
individuals should act faces intermediate scrutiny.154 In R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., the D.C. Circuit Court ruled 
that graphics on cigarette packages convey not only uncontroversial 
and purely factual information, but aim to evoke emotions and thus 
change the consumers’ behavior.155 Also, mandatory privacy-
enhancing defaults face intermediate scrutiny regarding the data 
collectors’ First Amendment rights. According to the Tenth Circuit 
Court’s ruling in U.S. West v. FCC, a FCC rule which obliged 
telecommunication service providers to require an opt-in before they 
were able collect their users’ data restricted the data collectors’ 
commercial free speech rights, as they needed to get consent before 
directing data-based targeting advertisement to the users. The court 
argued that privacy protection could serve as a substantial 
government interest, but the measure was not narrowly tailored, as 
the court could not find proof that citizens who care about their 
privacy would not as well protect it under a less restrictive opt-out 
rule.156 
152 See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980) (“we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. […] we must 
determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, 
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest”). 
153 See Allen Rostron, Pragmatism, Paternalism, and the Constitutional Protection of 
Commercial Speech, 37 VT. L. REV. 529, 571-572 (2013). 
154 See also Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle The Truth? Compelled Commercial 
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 J. OF CONSTITUTIONAL L. 569 (2012). 
155 The graphics were even accompanied by the display of the phone number “1–800–
QUIT–NOW” of a substance abuse counselor, see R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and 
Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 et seq. (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
156 See U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C., 182 F.3d 1224, 1239 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he FCC record 
does not adequately show that an opt-out strategy would not sufficiently protect customer 
privacy. The respondents merely speculate that there are a substantial number of 
individuals who feel strongly about their privacy, yet would not bother to opt-out if given 
notice and the opportunity to do so. Such speculation hardly reflects the careful calculation 
of costs and benefits that our commercial speech jurisprudence requires.”). 
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4. Summary 
 Some scholars suggest making competent adult users disclose less 
by either using compelled protection or nudges and thereby protect 
their own online privacy.  
 Under German law, preventing online self-disclosure infringes 
upon the right to informational self-determination and thus can only 
be justified by a legitimate government interest. 
 In the United States, limiting explicit disclosure by coercive 
measures infringes upon the First Amendment’s rights of the users 
and needs to be justified by a compelling government interest. Using 
nudges to do so does not fall under the First Amendment, but triggers 
procedural due process protection. Likewise, preventing implicit 
disclosure has to meet procedural due process standards and 
therefore requires a legitimate government interest. 
 However, such paternalistic interventions lack a legitimate or 
compelling respective legitimate government interest and thus cannot 
be justified. This is true not only of coercive measures, but also of 
libertarian paternalistic ones. 
IV. Comparison 
 Using compelled protection or nudges to prevent competent adult 
users from self-disclosure both in Germany and in the United States is 
only constitutional if the measures are justified. 
 The German right to informational self-determination (Art. 2 
para. 1 in conjunction with Art. 1 para. 1 Basic Law) amongst others 
protects the users’ right to self-disclosure. Government measures to 
prevent users from online self-disclosure with the only goal of 
protecting them against themselves lack a legitimate governmental 
interest and therefore are unconstitutional. 
 Under U.S. law, the First Amendment protects against compelled 
protection that would limit explicit disclosure. The Due Process Clause 
protects against nudges aimed to limit explicit disclosure as well as 
against compelled protection or nudges aimed at limiting implicit 
disclosure. Preventing self-disclosure with the only aim of protecting 
competent adult users from harms caused by themselves fails to 
pursue a compelling respectively legitimate interest and therefore is 
unconstitutional. To the authors’ view, these findings do extend to the 
unconstitutionality of nudges which are solely aimed at preventing 
irrational behavior. Such measures will have to face a rational basis 
review and it is doubtful if courts will rule that they pursue a 
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legitimate interest. Even if courts do so, regarding the data collectors’ 
First Amendment rights, nudges will face intermediate scrutiny. 
 Both the German and the U.S. society are confronted with the 
same harms self-disclosure can cause to individuals. Such self-
disclosures can theoretically be prevented or hindered by using 
compelled protection or nudges. However, under both legal systems 
protecting competent adult individuals from themselves cannot serve 
as a sufficient government interest to do so. 
F. CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
 It has been shown that despite the advantages of online self-
disclosure, it can also cause harms to the development of the users’ 
personalities.157 Governments could, in theory, limit online self-
disclosure by enforcing compelling privacy protection or nudging 
users into revealing less information about themselves.158 
 However, neither the German nor the U.S. government has the 
duty159 or even the power160 to coercively alter the privacy choices of 
competent adult users for the sole purpose of protecting them against 
harms they cause to themselves. Likewise, this paper argues that 
citing the irrationality of certain self-disclosures cannot serve as a 
justification for protecting competent adult users from these self-
disclosures by liberal paternalistic means. Thus under both legal 
systems preventing self-disclosure with the only goal of protecting 
competent adult users will always violate their constitutional rights. 
 Nevertheless, governments are not left with tied hands. This paper 
suggests focusing not on preventing self-disclosure solely for the 
individuals’ sake. A more promising route is to remember John Stuart 
Mill’s harm principle, according to which governments may only 
interfere with their citizens’ behavior when the welfare of others is at 
stake. Thus, attention should be directed towards the goal of 
preventing the harms self-disclosure can cause to third parties and 
society. Both German and U.S. courts have taken a generous approach 
when justifying measures that protect such interests and, as a side-
157 See B. 
158 See C. 
159 See D. 
160 See E. 
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effect, protect competent adult individuals who voluntarily endanger 
themselves.161 
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht based the constitutionality of 
seatbelt laws on the goal of protecting third parties. In a car crash, 
passengers who wear seatbelts are more likely to survive and, thus, be 
able to help others on the scene. Also, in a crash seatbelts avoid 
passengers to be catapulted against other passengers in the car.162 
Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a seatbelt law because it 
“serves the public safety and welfare by enhancing a driver’s ability to 
maintain control of his vehicle, and by reducing injuries not only to 
himself, but also to others, all of which directly affects the state’s 
economic welfare.”163 
 A duty to wear a helmet while riding a motorbike was held to be 
constitutional in both jurisdictions. The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
argues that accidents which cause severe head injuries harm the 
society as an emergency rescue service and doctors have to be 
involved, and further medical costs arise.164 The Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals held a duty to wear helmets constitutional as it was 
“intended to promote the welfare and safety of the general public as 
well as the cyclist, and bears a reasonable relationship to highway 
safety generally.”165 
 When upholding the prohibition of a peep show, the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht reasoned that such a ban aims at protecting 
the individuals’ human dignity which is of importance not only for the 
individual herself, but also for society at large.166 Similarly, 
161 Examples can be found in various other areas of the law: The Bundesverfassungsgericht 
held that regulating the consumption of drugs is constitutional as it aims at forming a 
society free from social harms caused by handling drugs, especially because the 
development of adolescents’ personalities can be hindered by the consumption of 
narcotics. See BVerwGE, Mar. 9, 1994, 90, 145 (174) (Ger.). The U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the government can prohibit assisting suicides to promote a government interest in 
protecting the integrity of the medical profession and to prevent a future trend to 
euthanasia and further abuse. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). 
162 See BVerwG, June 6, 1987, NJW 1987, 180, 180 (Ger.). 
163 See Richards v. State, 743 S.W.2d 747, 748 (Tex.App-Hous. 1st Dist. 1987). 
164 See BVerwG, Dec. 15, 1981, NJW 1982, 1276 (Ger.).  Justifying coerced protection with 
society’s interest in saving any kind of social welfare costs however seems to be a slippery 
slope, as it could allow government intervention with a majority of every day life decisions. 
165 Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). 
166 See BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1981, 64, 274 (280) (Ger.). 
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prostitution in the United States can be prohibited for the purpose of 
serving a “social interest in order and morality” (by contrast, 
prostitution is legal in Germany).167 
 The prohibition of smoking in restaurants in Germany was held to 
serve the outbalancing public interest of health protection even in tiny 
restaurants with no employees, in which only the owner and guests 
who choose to stay are affected.168 
 As these examples show, a broad interpretation of what can 
constitute a harm to third parties or society is licit. To justify 
government measures that prevent self-disclosure, it is advisable to 
investigate whether in the respective case there might be a 
government interest in such harms to others.169 
1. Harms to Third Parties 
 Self-disclosure can indeed threaten third parties, for example if 
the disclosed information allows conclusions to be drawn about them. 
An example for explicitly disclosed harmful information would be 
pictures which also show third parties or status updates that involve 
information about them. Also, implicit disclosure can harm third 
parties, as big data analysis allows predictions about health, financial 
situation, political views, etc. not only regarding the individuals, but 
also regarding their family members, partners, friends, neighbors, 
work colleagues, etc. 
 Governments in fact do react to such harms, for example by 
imposing privacy tort laws or recognizing special professional duties 
of confidentiality and secrecy (and thereby coerce informational 
privacy). 
167 State v. Mueller, 617 P.2d 1351, 1359 (Hawaii 1983) (regarding the Hawaiian right to 
privacy). 
168 See BVerfGE, Jul. 30, 2008, 121, 317 (357-358) (Ger.). 
169 In an interesting recent exchange (APA Newsletter, 13 Philosophy of Law 14, 14–19 
(2013), Prof. Beate Roessler suggested that Prof. Anita L. Allen, one of the most outspoken 
supporters of coercing privacy, should likewise concentrate on the collateral damages on 
third parties and society, precisely to avoid charges of paternalism. Allen responded (id. at 
19–27) that she felt that there are privacy harms to individuals that should not be tied up 
with harms to others. Their discussion is about moral, not legal justifications of legal 
measures. Taking Allen’s stance in the present, i.e. legal, setting, would mean to put 
intellectual honesty over legal pragmatism (maybe quite in accord with Allen’s Kantian 
sympathies). 
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 These disclosures still threaten individualistic privacy rights, even 
if the individuals harmed are different from those who disclose. 
Realizing that construing privacy as an essentially individualistic right 
diminishes its chances to prevail against competing large-scale 
societal values, legal scholars as well as philosophers, sociologists and 
other researchers have been putting ever more emphasis on privacy’s 
value for society in general.170 
2. Harms to Society 
 In fact, the harms on personal development and creativity that 
were discussed earlier (see B) can be argued to collectively amount to 
a threat to society that is greater than the sum of its parts. A well-
functioning society depends on its members’ abilities to self-govern. 
Only if the members can freely develop their personalities, will they be 
able to fully contribute to the success of society as a whole. A loss of 
individual informational privacy will therefore not only affect the 
individuals, but lead to “communities governed by apathy, impulse, or 
precautionary conformism”.171 The restrained creation of ideas will 
result in individuals not being able to contribute anything of interest 
to the society.172 
 Self-disclosure can harm the society both by interfering with 
society’s progress and by constraining democracy. 
a. Harms to Society’s Progress 
 Free development of personalities serves as the basis for cultural, 
scientific and economic progress of a society.173 Traditions have to be 
questioned, outdated customs to be abandoned, drawbacks to be 
identified, and improvements to be made. Scientific progress depends 
on the curiosity and courage of scientists, who are willing to take new 
paths. Innovations and new ideas contribute to a flourishing economy. 
170 See PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL VALUES, AND 
PUBLIC POLICY 212-241 (1995); Solove, supra note 4, at 89–98; Beate Roessler & Dorota 
Mokrosinska, Privacy and Social Interaction, 39 PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL CRITICISM 772, 
772 et seq. (2013). 
171 See Cohen, supra note 40, at 1426-1427. Similarly, Professor Neil M. Richards notes: 
“free minds are the foundation of a free society.” Richards, supra note 41, at 1946. 
172 See Richards, supra note 16, at 405; Richards, supra note 41, at 1948. 
173 See also Cohen, supra note 20, at 1918 et seq. 
226 I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY [Vol. 12:2 
However, they can be hindered by the described obstacles that a loss 
of informational privacy poses to the development of the individuals’ 
personalities. 
 A biased access to information can limit the users from developing 
new ideas that do not fit their old patterns.174 Self-censorship 
regarding both the access to information and the thinking process 
itself can lead to societal stagnation.175 
b. Harms to Democracy 
 A loss of informational privacy can harm the flourishing of 
democracy in three ways: By the effects of filter bubbles and by a self-
censorship both regarding the creation and expression of ideas. 
 A pre-selection of online sources by filter bubbles (see B I) can 
create the impression, deficits would either not exist or would yet be 
solved by a sufficient number of other people. Thus, individuals might 
refrain from taking necessary actions. They might also miss problems, 
as people would rather read pleasant than unpleasant information.176 
Whereas a newspaper’s editor will include both kinds of information, 
personalized search might not. As Professor Julie E. Cohen notes, in a 
society which is modulated by big data analysis, the individual 
information environment may be adjusted to the individual comfort 
level. To motivate citizens to take action, a “certain amount of 
discomfort” is necessary.177 
 Furthermore, as the Bundesverfassungsgericht states, democracy 
depends on its members’ ability to develop their personalities in a free 
and self-determined way.178 A fruitful formation of the public opinion 
demands interested and active citizens, who reach their own 
conclusions and contribute to public discourse.179 Each democracy 
depends on its members’ autonomy, as only self-determined 
individuals can meaningfully contribute. 
174 See Pariser, supra note 18, at 23. 
175 See Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 178-179. 
176 See also Pariser, supra note 18, at 26, 81-82. 
177 See Cohen, supra note 20, at 1918. 
178 See BVerfGE,  Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (42-43) (Ger.). 
179 See also Regan, supra note 170, at 225 et seq.; Richards, supra note 16, at 391; Paul M. 
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig’s Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters, Privacy-
Control, and Fair Information Practices, WIS. L. REV. 743, 761-762 (2000). 
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 In addition, even if citizens are able to freely develop ideas, a lack 
of informational privacy may impede them from announcing those 
ideas. Participation in democratic processes is not limited to voting, 
but also requires citizens to express their ideas in other forms, like 
joining demonstrations, working for political parties or interest 
groups, or speaking out in social networks, blogs, etc. While doing so, 
some might want to reveal their identity while others might prefer not 
to. Any form of political speech is a very sensitive issue as citizens 
cannot know if it can harm them now or later in their private or 
business relationships. They can neither predict whether in the future 
they will develop different political ideas nor whether the political 
system as a whole may develop in an extremist direction so their past 
statements may harm them one day. Therefore, it is likely that users 
feel uncomfortable with the existence of records about their political 
speech and would prefer to act anonymously. 
 The Bundesverfassungsgericht bases the development of the right 
to informational self-determination on the notion that citizens who 
are afraid that their participation in political processes may be 
registered and cause risks for them, might abstain from exercising 
their fundamental rights to associate and demonstrate.180 The U.S. 
Supreme Court acknowledges that “identification and fear of reprisal 
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of 
importance.”181 Professor Paul M. Schwartz asks: “[W]ho will speak or 
listen when this behavior leaves finely-grained data trails in a fashion 
that is difficult to understand or anticipate?”.182 
 That democracy-threatening self-censorship actually happens was 
shown by a 2013 survey among 528 journalists in the United States. 
Twenty-eight percent admitted to having restricted their use of social 
networks due to the fear of surveillance, twelve percent considered to 
do so. Sixteen percent avoided talking about certain issues, eleven 
percent considered to do so.183 The fact that this concerns journalists 
is of course especially problematic, because it feeds right into the 
point made at the beginning of this section - the insufficient and 
biased distribution of information to society at large. 
180 See BVerfGE, Dec. 15, 1983, 65, 1 (43) (Ger.). 
181 See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960). 
182 See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 1651. 
183 See FDR Group, supra note 36. 
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c. Other Harms to Society 
 Many other harms that a loss of privacy might engender have been 
identified and described. The philosopher Thomas Nagel speaks out 
for a society in which we do not “share our inner lives, bare our souls, 
give voice to all our opinions – in other words, become like one huge 
unhappy family”.184 He goes through a number of examples in which 
the only way in which conversations, debates and even disagreements 
can be had constructively is by withholding certain information. 
 Prof. Daniel Solove offers that privacy acts as a mitigating factor 
when social norms become overbearing. Even beneficial norms, he 
argues, should sometimes only be “imperfectly enforced”, and privacy 
guarantees little pockets of public un-attention to allow for this.185 
 Many researchers claim that social roles can only be successfully 
played if a certain degree of privacy exists. The proper relationship 
between a student and a teacher cannot be maintained if the teacher 
supplies too much personal information about him- or herself.186 
 To give one more example, and to pick up Nagel’s theme with a 
twist: Society depends on most children getting a first sense of good 
citizenship from their families. However, “the family can do justice to 
its different functions only if it can comprehend itself as a protected 
private sphere.”187 
 These diverse observations might well suffice to generally urge the 
inculcation of a more pronounced privacy ethics, and they might 
warrant relatively unproblematic government actions such as those 
discussed in the beginning of section C above. 
 However, it seems that limiting acts of self-disclosure, especially 
explicit ones, will be hard to justify with these arguments, at least as 
far as they are developed until now. Firstly, scholars need to get more 
concrete about the dangers of losses of privacy for society. The 
problem with many of these claims is that they are described in an 
unhelpfully abstract way, without examples that make the dangers 
palpable. For example, the only illustrative case Solove goes into in 
great detail regarding his point about overbearing social norms 
184 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1, 11 
(1998). 
185 Solove, supra note 4, at 94. 
186 See Roessler & Mokrosinska, supra note 170, at 780. 
187 Id. at 775. 
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concerns Victorian blackmail laws. Not only is this not a very current 
example, it also shows, by Solove’s own admission, privacy’s “potential 
dark side” instead of its virtues.188 
 Secondly, one would need to show clearly how self-disclosure in 
particular gives rise to these dangers. It is surely true that “[i]t is hard 
to imagine how people could freely participate in public life without 
some degree of control over their reputation and private life”.189 But to 
turn such an observation into an argument for restricting self-
disclosure, a government would have to show how unchecked self-
disclosure alone might lead to such a total loss of control. 
 However, it may well be possible to expand these arguments 
sufficiently to restrict self-disclosure, especially of the implicit sort. 
 In that case, further research will particularly have to focus on the 
data collectors’ rights. The German right to economic freedom (Art. 2 
para. 1 Basic Law) can be relatively easily limited in order to protect 
the rights of others, the constitutional order, and the moral law. In the 
United States, by contrast, limiting access to the users’ data restricts 
the data collectors’ First Amendment rights, as the data collectors are 
hindered in using the data for the purpose of targeted advertisement. 
Hence, such restrictions are only justified when meeting the Central 
Hudson standard.190 Also, nudges which compel data collectors to 
deliver speech which is not uncontroversial and not purely factual face 
intermediate scrutiny according to the Central Hudson standard.191 
Privacy protection serves in principle as a substantial government 
interest to justify such measures, but only if the government can prove 
significant and concrete harms.192 Thus, the rights of the data 
 
 
 
 
188 Solove, supra note 4, at 96. 
189 Id. at 93. 
190 In a similar case, the U.S. Supreme Court, without further specifying its idea, recently 
even called for a “heightened scrutiny”. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2657 
(2011) (regarding a statute that limited pharmaceutical companies’ access to pharmacies’ 
data which revealed prescription habits of doctors). 
191 See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Food and Drug Admin., 696 F.3d 1205, 1216 et seq. 
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (regarding graphics on cigarette packages). 
192 See the obiter dicta in U.S. West, Inc. v. F.C.C. 182 F.3d 1224, 1235 (10th Cir. 1999)  
(“[T]he government must show that the dissemination of the information desired to be 
kept private would inflict specific and significant harm on individuals, such as undue 
embarrassment or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive 
personal information for the purposes of assuming another’s identity. Although we may 
feel uncomfortable knowing that our personal information is circulating in the world, we 
live in an open society where information may usually pass freely. A general level of 
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collectors in both countries will have to be taken into consideration 
when enacting government measures that prevent online self-
disclosure. It can be expected that those rights will create a larger 
obstacle in the United States than in Germany. 
 
 
                                                                                                                   
discomfort from knowing that people can readily access information about us does not 
necessarily rise to the level of a substantial state interest under Central Hudson for it is not 
based on an identified harm.”). 
